

API DOCUMENTATION SAMPLE

# FamNest API Reference

Five production REST endpoints, documented from the live codebase.

**System** FamNest — AI wellness coach for parents (Next.js 16 · Supabase · Groq Llama 3.3 70B)

**Scope** Authenticated user endpoints, payment webhook, and scheduled jobs

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**Source** Extracted directly from `app/api/**/route.ts`, June 2026

# 1. Overview

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FamNest exposes a small set of server-side REST endpoints under `/app/api` in addition to its primary server-action data flow. This document covers every HTTP-reachable route in the production codebase: what it does, how it authenticates, and what it returns — written by reading the implementation, not by guessing at intent.

Endpoints fall into three categories:

- **User-facing** — called from the browser by a signed-in user (`/api/export`).
- **Payment** — called by Flutterwave, the payment processor (`/api/webhooks/flutterwave`, `/api/billing/callback`).
- **Scheduled** — called by Vercel Cron on a fixed schedule, never by a browser (`/api/cron/*`).

## 2. Authentication patterns

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Pattern	Used by	How it works
Supabase session cookie	<code>/api/export</code>	Request is authenticated via the user's existing Supabase session cookie. The route rejects with <code>401</code> if <code>supabase.auth.getUser()</code> returns no user.
Webhook signature header	<code>/api/webhooks/flutterwave</code>	Flutterwave sends a static secret in the <code>verif-hash</code> header. It is compared to <code>FLUTTERWAVE_SECRET_HASH</code> using <code>crypto.timingSafeEqual</code> to avoid timing attacks — never a plain <code>===</code> on secret values.
Bearer cron secret	<code>/api/cron/*</code>	Vercel Cron sends <code>Authorization: Bearer &lt;CRON_SECRET&gt;</code> automatically when <code>CRON_SECRET</code> is set. The route is otherwise unauthenticated, so this header is mandatory in production.
None (redirect flow)	<code>/api/billing/callback</code>	No auth — this is a public redirect target. It re-verifies the transaction server-side against the Flutterwave API before granting anything, so the query string itself is never trusted.

## 3. Endpoints

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**GET** `/api/export`

Session cookie required

Exports the signed-in user's full check-in history as CSV.

<b>Query params</b>	None
<b>Rate limit</b>	10 requests / hour / user, backed by a Postgres function (durable across cold starts — see §5)
<b>Success</b>	200 — text/csv body, Content-Disposition: attachment
<b>Errors</b>	401 not signed in · 429 rate limit exceeded

```
# Response headers
Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="famnest-checkins-2026-06-24.csv"
Cache-Control: no-store

# Response body
date,mood,stress_level,sleep_hours,available_minutes,goal
2026-06-20T07:12:00.000Z,4,2,7.5,15,"Get through the morning without yelling"
```

**POST** /api/webhooks/flutterwave

verif-hash header

Receives payment events from Flutterwave. Handles both first purchase and auto-renewal — both arrive as the same `charge.completed` event type.

<b>Required header</b>	verif-hash — must constant-time-equal FLUTTERWAVE_SECRET_HASH
<b>Body</b>	Flutterwave event payload, e.g. { "event": "charge.completed", "data": { "id": 123, "status": "successful" } }
<b>Success</b>	200 — { "received": true }
<b>Errors</b>	401 bad/missing signature · 400 unparseable body · 500 handler error

**Security note:** the webhook body is never trusted for the actual grant. On a valid `charge.completed` event the handler calls `verifyTransaction()` against the Flutterwave API directly before calling `activatePremiumFromTransaction()` — the webhook is a trigger to re-check, not a source of truth. Unrecognized events (e.g. `subscription.cancelled`) are acknowledged with 200 and ignored, since they're handled elsewhere in-app.

**GET** /api/billing/callback

Public — re-verified server-side

Where Flutterwave's hosted checkout redirects the browser after payment. Makes the first purchase feel instant instead of waiting on webhook delivery; the webhook above remains the source of truth for renewals.

<b>Query params</b>	<code>status</code> (string), <code>transaction_id</code> (string)
<b>Behavior</b>	Verifies the transaction server-side, then 303-redirects to <code>/billing</code> with a status flag
<b>Redirects</b>	<code>?checkout=success</code> · <code>?checkout=cancelled</code> · <code>?checkout=error</code>

**GET** `/api/cron/daily-reminder` Bearer CRON\_SECRET

Runs daily. Sends a reminder email to every user who hasn't checked in today and hasn't opted out.

<b>Success</b>	<code>200</code> with a per-run summary, e.g. <code>{ "totalUsers": 412, "skippedAlreadyCheckedIn": 188, "targeted": 224, "sent": 219, "failed": 5 }</code>
<b>Errors</b>	<code>401</code> missing/wrong bearer token · <code>500</code> on a Supabase query failure (returned as <code>{ "error": "&lt;message&gt;" }</code> )

**GET** `/api/cron/weekly-report` Bearer CRON\_SECRET

Runs weekly for Premium subscribers only. Pulls each user's last 7 days of check-ins, asks Groq (Llama 3.3 70B) for a short, kind summary, saves it, and emails it. Falls back to a templated (non-AI) summary if the Groq call fails on quota — a paying user never sees a broken report because of an upstream rate limit.

<b>Eligibility filter</b>	<code>subscriptions.plan IN (monthly, annual) and status IN (active, trialing)</code>
<b>Success (no eligible users)</b>	<code>200</code> — <code>{ "premiumUsers": 0, "sent": 0 }</code>
<b>Errors</b>	<code>401</code> missing/wrong bearer token · <code>500</code> on a Supabase query failure

## 4. Error format & status codes

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FamNest's API does not use a single global error envelope — error shape follows the endpoint's purpose:

- **Plain-text body** for simple auth/rate-limit rejections (`401`, `429`) — e.g. `export` and the webhook.
- **JSON** `{ "error": "..."}`  for query-level failures inside cron jobs, since their caller (Vercel) reads structured logs, not a UI.
- **Redirect with query flag** for the browser-facing billing callback, since the consumer is a page, not a script.

## 5. Rate limiting

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Rate limiting is backed by a Postgres function ( `check_rate_limit` ), not an in-memory counter — an in-memory `Map` resets on every serverless cold start and would silently stop limiting. The limiter **fails open**: if the limiter RPC itself errors, the request is allowed. For a wellness app, never locking out a real parent due to an infrastructure hiccup matters more than perfectly enforcing a cap.